The Frontier

Ari Flans argues the 2021 clashes at the Al-Aqsa Mosque and settler expulsions in East Jerusalem broke a long peace. That year, Hamas rockets killed 14 Israelis, internal Arab-Jewish riots erupted, and West Bank militants like Lion's Den formed.

Flans traces Hamas's strategic crisis to the post-2014 'silence' in Gaza. He claims the group faced internal pressure for transitioning from resistance to ineffective governance while Gazans' quality of life stagnated.

Flans cites a 2018 interview where Hamas leader Yahya Sinwar said Netanyahu's 'victory will be worse than defeat' and that Israel 'should take over Gaza'. Flans interprets this as Sinwar understanding a major war could trap Israel in a costly, open-ended occupation.

Flans contends Sinwar viewed the post-2014 status quo as 'poison' for Palestinian resistance. He planned October 7 to shatter that stagnation, expecting a catastrophic Israeli response that would reset regional dynamics and draw Israel into a prolonged, draining conflict.

Flans states concrete planning for October 7 likely began around October 2022, the same year Hamas repaired relations with Iran and Syria and its leaders visited Moscow. Israeli intelligence reportedly found a binder detailing plans on the border that month.

A retired Israeli general told Flans the IDF had only destroyed about 25% of Hamas tunnels, sealing the rest with concrete. Soldiers reported Hamas repaired tunnels during the war, and the specialized material for total destruction was expensive and scarce.

Flans says Israel allowed suitcases of Qatari cash into Gaza pre-October 7 to maintain a calm status quo. The logic was to keep Hamas 'happy and fat' so it wouldn't attack, a policy Sinwar ultimately exploited.