The Frontier

Stephen Shaw argues the 21st century will see interstate conflict resurface because differential fertility decline creates windows where nations see their last chance to field an army.

Simone Collins says AI disruption will push women back toward family-oriented careers, as traditional 'lanyard class' jobs are automated.

Lyman Stone argues costs are a local friction but not the root cause of low fertility; cultural norms define the expensive 'package' of goods people now expect with parenthood.

Stephen Shaw cites data showing achieving one's desired family size correlates with lower depression, while IVF failure doubles the likelihood of being prescribed antipsychotics.

Stone notes national debts and bond markets will be serviced by fewer future taxpayers, making government financing harder and reducing investment.

Collins asserts selection pressures now favor 'hyper-autist agency maxes,' creating a dangerous monoculture for humanity's future.

Stone says cash incentives can work: a meta-analysis suggests South Korea could reach replacement fertility by dedicating 12% of GDP to child benefits.

Shaw explains primary education reduces fertility causally, but tertiary education expansion does not show a credible causal effect.

Collins advocates for 'pan-natalism,' supporting people to have the children they want while respecting those who choose not to.

Stone highlights the 'vitality curve': a society's fertility rate can be predicted with high accuracy from the average age and width of motherhood timing alone.

Shaw states falling fertility unevenly cannibalizes young people's futures as pension obligations consume municipal budgets for police and schools.

Collins believes AI can provide happiness substitutes for childless people via 'pleasure pods' and fake families, while she focuses on building futures for pronatalists.

Stone argues low fertility societies develop 'magnet cities' like Tokyo where young people cluster, leaving rural areas to die out.

Shaw says the real economic cost of low fertility is lost innovation, as fewer young people in capital-rich societies reduces the supply of geniuses and demand for new products.

Global fertility is projected to fall to 1.8 by 2050 and 1.6 by 2100; by 2100 only six countries will remain at or above replacement level.

The US recorded its lowest fertility rate of 1.62 births per woman in 2024, with 710,000 fewer children born last year compared to the 2007 peak.

In the UK, being childless at age 30 is now the norm, rising from 48% to 58%.

At a fertility rate of 1.0, the total births in one generation equal the summed total births of all future generations, due to perpetual halving.

Shaw notes the halfway point between fertility rates of 2.0 and 1.0 in terms of halving time is 1.92, not 1.5.

Current industrial world births are halving every 50 to 60 years at fertility rates around 1.5-1.6.

Around 25-30% of people in the UK cite money as the primary reason for not having children.

In the US, women have a 50% chance of ever becoming a mother by age 27.

Conservative family size has risen since the 1980s while liberal family size has fallen sharply, from 1.44 to 0.87.

Surveys indicate 90% of people at some point either have or want kids.

About 80% of childless women who reach menopause say they wanted children.

Marrying before age 27 predicts hitting one's desired family size; marrying later sees odds fall sharply.

South Korea's average age for first child is 33, driving a rise in one-child families.

Shaw says most fertility decline occurs at the first parity; odds of moving from two to three children have not fallen much in 20 years.

Bob King argues that chronic back pain is primarily a design problem, not a discipline issue, pointing to widespread unhealthy sitting postures like hunching forward.

Dr. Stu McGill is cited as the world's leading lower back pain doctor. Bob King recounts McGill's story about a suicidal patient who saw surgery as her only option.