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Seed argues that users who manually generated private keys by rolling dice were unaffected by the Coldcard random number generator exploit. Thomas Susanka cautions that manual dice rolls introduce human error, citing instances of non-technical users entering repetitive numbers.
Thomas Susanka argues that excessive security measures destroy usability, which ultimately degrades actual security by confusing users. Conversely, Seed suggests making self-custody intentionally harder to force users to understand their key-generation processes.
Thomas Susanka and Seed advocate for multi-vendor multi-signature setups to protect assets against vendor-specific bugs. Thomas Susanka emphasizes that using multiple devices from the same manufacturer fails to mitigate systemic software vulnerabilities.
Drew Fisher and Zach Herbert recommend using burner emails, PO boxes, or buying hardware with cash at conferences to avoid tracking. Seed suggests local Bitcoin meetup organizers act as purchasing buffers by bulk-ordering devices for their members.
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