The real threat to Ukraine’s nuclear plants isn't just a missile strike. It’s the political culture of the soldiers inside.
Historian Serhii Plohi argues the 1986 Chernobyl disaster was a product of Soviet secrecy, not just flawed engineering. Speaking on The Intelligence from The Economist, he explained the reactor's design was adapted from military technology for producing weapon-grade plutonium. Its quirks were classified, leaving even the operators ignorant of the machine's limits. When they hit the emergency button, it detonated.
That same political culture now occupies Zaporizhzhia. Plohi contends that modern Russia shares the Soviet instinct for hierarchy over safety and hiding responsibility. The 2022 invasion didn’t just put reactors on the front line; it reintroduced a historically catastrophic management style into Europe’s largest nuclear plant.
Russia’s actions shattered the global taboo against militarizing atomic facilities. An attack was once unthinkable; now it is a proven tactic. Plohi notes that international law is dangerously outdated, treating reactors like hydroelectric dams and leaving the International Atomic Energy Agency powerless to intervene when a state turns a plant into a fortress.
Drones have made the situation more volatile. A non-nuclear state can now trigger a nuclear event by striking a rival's cooling systems or spent fuel storage. Luck has been the main defense. A Russian drone pierced the Chernobyl sarcophagus in 2025 without a major release, but as Plohi argues, relying on luck is not a strategy.
The original Chernobyl blast stalled nuclear power's growth for a generation. Only three new reactors have been built in the U.S. in 30 years, and the Fukushima disaster prompted Germany to abandon nuclear power entirely. This new era of weaponization creates another chilling precedent.
Plohi’s warning is direct: We have no business building new reactors until a global convention protects existing ones during war. The taboo is gone, and the world is unprepared.
